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ABSTRACT
The thesis of this study is that the goal of 
political democracy, which was based on Kenya's 
"African Socialism," has over time fallen in 
abeyance because the political leaders underestimated 
possible barriers (such as ethnic-political conflict) 
when defining the ideas of "African Socialism."
This study evaluates Kenya's economic, political, 
and social systems in operation before white conquest, 
during colonialism, and after independence. This 
approach is analytical and explains how the system 
as a whole functions or fails to function.
The thesis concludes that the government's goal 
of political democracy has not been met because it was 
based on misconceived notions of "African Socialism." 
African tribalism existed before "African Socialism" 
and continues to dominate the Kenya society.
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PREFACE
Most writers on African politics have been Western 
scholars. Obvious differences in culture, religion, 
language, customs, and even manners may often result 
in conflicts between western and African perspectives..
Other writers on African politics are African 
politicians. They represent poor economies and under­
developed political systems.- Their feelings for 
fellow Africans and the zeal of African nationalism, 
results sometimes in misplaced emphasis, misrepresen­
tations, and distortion of facts.
There is a considerable amount of literature 
dealing with Kenyan society. Critics may argue that 
everything that is essential has already been written, 
but- political scientists have, on the whole, neglected 
the comparative study of political systems in African 
tribes. This study does not claim to be the final 
word on Kenya. It is rather an attempt to examine 
Kenya from several perspectives, explaining how the 
country, as a whole, has functioned or failed to 
function.
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The thesis of this study is that the goal of 
political democracy, based1 on Kenya's "African 
Socialism" was and is incompatible with the tribal - 
political culture of Kenya's politically dominant 
tribe, the Kikuyu. "Political democracy" is to be 
understood as a principle founded on respect of the 
human being--every human being, and implies the 
acceptance of .equality of all citizens regardless 
of race or tribe. Political democracy must also 
guarantee every individual the full rights of 
democratic citizenship without discrimination.
In the African sense, "Socialism" meant mutual 
caring, democratic equality of individuals, and 
"rational" utilization of the factors of production 
for the benefit of all the people. The government 
had the responsibility to control this process and • 
to ensure that economic and political development 
functioned according to the dictates of mutual 
social responsibility and is generally.understood 
to include among its goals:
1. political equality;
2. social justice;
3. human dignity including freedom of conscience 
freedom from want, disease, and exploitations
5. Equal opportunities; and
6. high and growing per capita incomes, 
equitably distributed.!
The government of Kenya, as well as its only
political party, the Kenyan African National Union
(KANU), has based its program of modernization and
development on the illusory supposition that the.
intertribal independence which mobilized black
Kenyans in the struggle for unity could be perpetuated
after liberation. Thus, cultural fragmentation along
tribal lines was to be1replaced by Kenyan nationalism,
producing a political community drawing upon shared
traditional values but resistant to ethnic cultural
incompatabilities.
These aspi,rations and expectations were best
articulated in Kenya Government Sessional Paper
Number’ 10, 1965* "African Socialism and its Application
to Planning in Kenya", Ministry of Information, Kenya
1965» pp. 1-18. In brief summary the following are
some elements of "African Socialism".
In the phrase "African Socialism", the ■. 
word "African" is not introduced to describe a 
continent to which a foreign ideology is to be 
transplanted. It is meant to convey the African 
roots of a system that is itself African in its , 
characteristics. African Socialism is a term 
describing an African political and economic
system that is positively"African not being 
imported from any country or being a blueprint 
of any foreign ideology but capable of incorpora­
ting useful and compatible techniques from whatever 
source. . .
There are two African traditions which form 
an essential basis for African Socialism-- 
political democracy and mutual social responsi­
bility. Political democracy implies that each 
member of society is equal in his political rights 
and that no individual or group will be permitted 
to exert .undue influence on the policies of the 
state. The State, therefore, can never become 
the tool of special interests, catering to the 
desires of a minority at the expense of the needs 
of the majority. The State will represent all 
of the people and will do so impartially and without 
prejudice.
Political democracy in the African tradition 
would not, therefore, countenance a party of the 
elite, stem tests or discriminatory criteria for 
party membership, degrees of party membership, or 
first and second class citizens. In African 
Socialism, every member of society is important, 
and equal; every mature citizen can belong to the 
party without restriction or discrimination; and 
the party will entertain and accommodate different
points of view, African Socialism rests on full, 
equal and unfettered democracy.
Mutual social responsibility is an extension - 
of the African family spirit to the nation as a 
whole, with the hope that ultimately the. same 
spirit.can be extended to even larger areas.
First of all, although the paper was launched in 
an atmosphere of national unity and appeared to be a 
unifying force of the Kenyan people, it was not 
entirely so. Popular interest and involvement in the 
political system caused frequent tribal conflicts. In 
addition, the social system was internally stratified 
so that it was less likely to organize an integrated 
society.
The document, launched in immediate post-indepen-- 
dence euphoria, was both unrealistic and dissembling. 
Tribal particularism did not wither away but rather 
intensified as political participation and institution- 
building increased. Social stratification further 
undermined ephemeral national unity. The document did 
not reflect a unified political culture but mixed 
indigenous and western ideas which were often nebulously 
understood and incompatible, eliciting the vigorous 
dissent of Oginga Odinga, among others, who wrote:
In the mouths of 'the government and KANU
leaders, ."African Socialism" has become a
meaningless phrase. What they call African
Socialism is neither African nor socialism.
It is a cloak for the practice of total
capitalism. To describe the policies .of the
present government as "African Socialism" is
an insult to the intelligence of people. The
deception is obvious, but the leaders of the
government and of KANU do not have the courage
to admit that they are fully committed to the
2western ideology of capitalism.
Odinga°s skepticism is reflected in a similar state­
ment by Julius Nyerere:
We in Africa have no more need of being 
converted to socialism than we have of being
taught democracy. Both are rooted in our past--
. . . 2m  the traditional society which produced us. -
Regardless of the geriuiness of KANUV;s devotion to 
"African Socialism", the political democratic goals 
articulated in the document ignored the reality of inter 
tribal conflict in Kenya. The authors of the document 
were most probably aware of this undermining incompati­
bility. In order to prove these assertions this thesis 
will first describe and analyze Kenyan culture prior .to
independence, emphasizing'both the unifying and dis- 
unifying elements between the tribal cultures. Second 
the thesis will describe the British colonial policy 
of "divide and conquer, unity and rule." And third, 
the*thesis will conclude with an analysis of post- 
independencc Kenyan politics when the incompatibilitye 
between nation-building and tribal loyalties all but 
unmasked the goals of political democracy and "African 
Socialism" as unattainable if not undesired.
GEOGRAPHICAL AND PRE-COLONIAL SETTING
Kenya covers an area of approximately 225>000 
square miles, and consists of seven politico- 
geographic regions; the Rift Valley, Central Province, 
Eastern Province, Nyanza Province, Northeastern Provinc 
CoastrPrbvince', Western Province," and Nairobi Province.
The Rift Valley is the largest of the Provinces, 
(Fig. 1) slicing through the center of the country 
from its southernmost border, with Tanzania to the 
western side of Lake. Turkana. It is populated by the 
Kalenjin, Samburu, Dorobo and Kikuyu tribes. . Central 
Province,'Largely populated by the Kikuyus, lies to the 
east of the Rift Valley, southwest of Mt. Kenya. The 
third largest of the provinces is Eastern. It has a 
common frontier with Ethiopia. The main tribes are 
the Turkana, Meru, Embu, Kamba, and nomadic Rendille 
and Boran. Northeastern is sparsely populated, lying 
along the Kenya-Somali border. It is mainly populated ■ 
by the Somali.1 Coast Province lies on the Indian Ocean 
Its tribes include Bayun, Galla, Giriama, Rabai, Digo, 
Taita, and Taveta. The Nyanza Province runs northward 
through Lake Nyanza. The province is. predominantly 
peopled by Luo. Western Province touches the Uganda-.
Kenya border and is peopled mainly by the Luyia. 
Nairobi Province is centrally located and is the 
center of government. Its inhabitants come from 
all over the country.
The following list, based on 1970 census data, 
gives a good picture of the location of population 
and tribal composition of the provinces.
E th n ic  G ro u p N u m b e r P e rc e n t
T ra d it io n a l  ^ — 
O c c u p a tio n
L in g u a ^ e
G ro up I r o  v incc D iH in c i
Kenyan Africans
Kikuyu ................... . 2,201,632 20.12 Agriculture • Bantu Central Kiambu, Murang’a, Nyeri, Kirin
Luo • . .  „ ................... .. 1,521,695 13.91 --------d o ---------- Nilotic Nyanza Kisumu, Siaya, Homa Bay
Luhya .......................... 1,453,302 13.28 . . .  do - - * Bantu Western Bungoma, Busia, Kakamega
Kam ba....................... . 1,197,712 10.95 --------do - - - --------do - - - Eastern Machakos, Kitui
Kalenjin ................... 1,190,203 10.88 -  -  - do - - - Paranilotic R ift Valley Kericho, Uasin Gishu, Kara 1 
Nandi, Baringo, Elgeyo-Mara
Kisii (G u s ii) ............. 701,679 6.41 . . .  d o -------- Bantu Nvanza Kisii
Meru .......................... 554,256 6.07 -------- do - - - . . .  do - - - Eastern Meru
Mijikenda . . . . ......... 520,620 4.76 Agriculture, some 
herding, fishing
-----d o ---------- Coast Kwale, K ilifi
S o m ali........................ 250,112 2.29 Pastoralism Cushitic North-Eastern Garissa" W ajir, Mandera
Turkana ............................. 203,177 1.86 --------do - - - Paranilotic Rift Valley Turkana
M asai.......................... 154,906 1.42 - - - do -  -  - i -  -  - d o -------- --------do - -  - Kajiado.N arok
E m b u ....................................... 117,969 1.08 Agriculture Bantu Eastern Embu
T a i t a .......................... 108,494 1 .0 0 --------do - - - --------do - -  - Coast Taita
lteso (T e s o ) .................... 85,800 0.78 --------d o ---------- Paranilotic Western Bungoma
Kuria (T e n d a ) ............. 59,875 0.54 -  -  - d o -------- Bantu Nvanza Homa Bay
Sam buru ............................. 54,7% 0.50 Pastoralism Paranilotic Rift Valley Samburu
Tharaka..................... 51.883 0.45 Agriculture Bantu Eastern Meru
Mbere ........................ 49,247 0.45 - - - do - - - --------do * -  - . . .  d o -------- Embu
Pokomo ................................. 35,181 0.32 Agriculture and 
fishing -
. . .  do - - - Coast Tana River
Boran.......................... 34,086 0.31 Pastoralism Cushitic Eastern Marsabit, Isiolu
B a ju n ....................................... 24,387 0.22 Fishing and 
agriculture
Bantu Coast Lamu
Nderobo (Dorobo). . 21,034 0.19 Hunting and 
gathering
Paranilotic Rift Valley Laikipia, Nakuru
, Rendille.................. 18,729 0.17 Pastoralism Cushitic Eastern Marsabit
O rm a ..................... 16,306 0.15 - - - do - - - . . .  do - - - Coast Tana River
Gabbra ................. 16.108 0.15 - - - do - - - . . .  do - - * Eastern Marsabit
Swahili-Shirazi. .. 9,971 0.09 Trade, fishing, Bantu 
agriculture
Coast Mombasa, Kwale
N je m p s ................. 6,520 0.00 Fishing Paranilotic Rift Valley Baringo
Taveta ................. .. 6,324 0.06 Agriculture and trade Banfu Coast Taita
Sakuve ................. 4,369 0.04 Pastoralism Cushitic Eastern Isiolo
Bond .....................
! 3,972 0.04
[ Hunting and gathering - - -d o ----- Coast Lamu
Sanve1 ................... .. I j Hunting, some - - - do - - • 
I cultivating
- - - do - - - Tana River
Gosha..................... 2.928 0.03 Agriculture - - - do - - - North-Eastern Mandera
Total ................. . .  10,677,079 97.58
N oxi-Kenyan
Africans*........... 56,123 0.51
Non-Africans*
Asians'*................. 139,037 1.27
E uro pean s........... 40,593 0.37
Arabs...................... 27,886 0.25
Total ................. 207,516 1.89
Others* .......................... 1,987 0.02
T O T A L 10,942,705 100.00
* Bom  and  Ran y e  wt-rv c o m b in ed  in cenau*
* M ain ly  from  T am tam * an d  to  a lean e r r i t e n t  fro m  U g an d a; aom e fro m  R w a n d a .
• In  c o n tr a s t  to  A frican  g ro u p * , n u m b er*  d ec lined  a f te r  11*69, but p r rc ia e  f igu re*  w e re  n o t av a ila b le  in 1975.
4 A li j>enK>na o r ig in a tin g  from  A sia  e x c e p t  thoae  from  th e  M iddle..CaaL
•  E th n ic  g ro u p  n o t specified .
Source: Rased on information from Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Statistics Division, Kenya Population, Census, 1969, I ,  Novei 
1970.
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The majority of Kenya’s tribes are of Bantu stock, 
which immigrated northward from south Central-Africa 
in the first millenium A.D. The largest tribe in this 
group are the Kikuyus who live in the highlands around 
Mt. Kenya. Other Bantu tribes are the Embu; Meru;
Wakamba; Luyia; Kisii; and Nyika, or the Coastal Africans. 
The Bantu tribes differ from the other groups in lan­
guage and culture. They also constitute a majority of 
the population of Kenya. They speak dialects unintel­
ligible to the other groups and subsist mainly as 
herdsman, keeping cattle and goats. They also raise 
some crops, notably maize and millet. Some still hunt 
and collect wild plants.
The Luos are racially and linguistically allied to 
the Ugandan and Tanzanian Luos. They belong to the 
Nilotic group. They were essentially small cultivators 
(not pastoralists) using different types of hoes and 
living on yams, millet, and fish. They kept cattle 
and sheep in small numbers and had no individual or 
family rights to land. Everyone grazed and watered his . 
cattle wherever he wished. They were involved in con­
stant battles with the Luyia. However, during times 
of prosperity, temporary hospitality was extended 
between neighboring families of the two tribes. They 
were confined to the Nyanza plateus and never came in 
contact with other interior tribes. They remained 
unmixed with allied blood.
The Nandi and the Kalenjin are also non-Bantu.
They are excellent cultivators, but like the Bantus, 
recognize cattle as symbols of wealth. They live in 
Rift Valley.
The Masai are Nilo-Hamites. They lived in the 
grasslands of southern Kenya and neighboring Tanzania. 
They introduced many arts such as the working of iron 
(previously unknown to the Bantus), and probably cattle-
a
keeping and sheep-rearing as well. They are the greatest 
fighters that Africa has ever known, with a superior 
military tribal organization. Although much smaller 
than most of the tribes, they were perhaps the most 
feared tribe in Kenya. Owing to the grazing and water 
needs of their livestock, they are essentially nomadic. 
Like the Somali, Rendelles, and the Boran, they wander 
intermittently following the movements of game in search 
of water.
There are several other minor Kenyan tribes which 
have distinct characteristics and are mainly closer to 
the non-Bantu tribes.
All Kenyan tribes, except the Luos and Turkana 
practice circumcision. Through it, individuals gained 
membership to an age-set, which provided them with new 
identity in their community. The grouping into age-sets 
also provided a system of seniority ranking, the basis 
of which important social duties--such as judicial, 
military, and eldership--were allocated.
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The Luos and Turkana also practice age-set 
groupings however, the ascendency into the first adult 
age set does not include the ceremony of circumcision.
Further examination into the traditional values 
attached to adulthood among the Kikuyus reveals yet 
another political dimension. The Kikuyus "believe that 
uninitiated men should not hold any political or public 
office on behalf of the community, regardless of other 
qualities. All uncircumcised men had no membership in 
the tribal community. For example, they could not attend 
political or judicial meetings. Their testimony and 
judgment was considered that of a child. They could 
not marry or mix freely within their respective tribes. 
They were still children.
The Kikuyu tribe, for instance, use the word 
"Kihii" to refer to uncircumeised men, regardless of 
tribe or nationality. They also use the word "Mwanake", 
which is a more respectable word for a grown-up or a 
circumcised man. When pressed, the Kikuyu tribes 
recognize a "real man" distinction between themselves 
and the Luos because Luos are uncircumcised. The 
ancient tribal beliefs therefore still prevail. One 
might even argue that the cultural "mind" of the 
Kikuyu does not exclude the Luo or Turkana man from 
participating in non-leadership roles in government, 
however an uncircumcised man as a national leader is 
unthinkable. On the other hand the absence of cultural
beliefs about circumcision•of Women does not preclude 
their ascending to leadership in the Kikuyu "mind."
Strong tribal beliefs are also another important 
ingredient in tribal culture. In his analysis of 
belief systems, Philip Converse describes a belief 
system as follows:
. . . a belief system is a configuration of
beliefs in which the elements are bound together 
by some form of constraint or functional inter- 
dependenc e.
'Hence, an evaluation of tribal beliefs and 
their form of "constraint" or "functional inter­
dependence" within a given tribe assures . . .
a reasonable degree of success in evaluating
some major elements of political conflict based
A
on beliefs or values held by various tribes.
Tribal beliefs are still held strongly as well in 
Kenya today' and therefore Kenyan society is made up .of 
incongruant systems of beliefs. The success, of the 
contemporary political system depends on major modifica 
tion or total elimination of some of these beliefs 
because they encourage conflict. The last chapters 
of this thesis will be concerned with the relationship 
between types of beliefs and types of conflict.
It is not the purpose of1'this study, however to 
stray into the broad and more difficult discussion of 
Kenya's tribes and their past. Rather, an analysis of 
symbolic beliefs will be made to test the hypothesis.
In his book, Facing Mt. Kenya, Kenyatta argues,., 
that the structure of the Kikuyu government was demo­
cratic prior to the advent of the Europeans.
At the first meeting, every village appointed 
a representative to the council which passed laws 
for the tribe.^
For the purposes of this study, the following laws 
are important:
(1) Universal tribal membership as the unification 
of the whole tribe, the qualification for it 
to be based on an individual's adult status and 
not on the extent of his property. For this 
reason, it was then decided that every member 
of the community, after passing through the 
circumcision ceremony as a sign of adulthood, 
could take an active, part in the government: . .
socially and politically all circumcised men 
and women equally could be full members of the 
tribe . . . the government would be in the hands
of councils of elders (Kiama) chosen from all 
members of the community. . . (Author's emphasis)
It should he noted that only those circumcised were 
considered adults and therefore full voting members, 
of the tribe.
On the central importance of circumcision, Godfred 
Muriuki, in his book on The History of the Kikuyu: „
1500-1900, writes:
The initiation rituals ^circumcision] drama­
tized the symbolic "death of c h i l d h o o d a n d  the 
"birth" of adulthood. Childhood had tied the young 
to their family, their lineage or locality; adult­
hood, on the other hand, flung the adolescents 
into the willing arms of the community as a 
whole . . . consequently, initiation was not a
private concern but a public and communal rite.
It was a crucial importance to the community as a 
whole because it conferred social status upon the 
initiates. To the Kikuyu, circumcision was of 
fundamental importance. It stands for the whole 
values embodied in the age.class system with all 
its "educational, social, moral and religious 
implications. It is a "conditio sine quo non" 
for being a real Kikuyu and the visible and out- 
ward sign of adhering to the tribal cultures. 1
Circumcision was and is so fundamental to the definition 
of an adult member of society, that the thought of an 
•uncircumcised chronological adult having an active
16
part in society, let alone, leadership, is an 
impossibility.
Despite tribal differences in culture, relative 
wealth or living conditions, all tribes shared many 
similarities in social structure. The "family" was, 
the heart of the tribal society. The young members' of 
the family had an obligation to help the older members. 
Mutual helpfulness was a virtue not only essential but 
also compulsory. In addition all tribes encouraged 
the worth and freedom of the individual. The concept 
of property rights among all tribes was directly, .related 
to the mode of life. Rights to the exclusive use of 
anything resulted from work expended or habitual use 
by a particular individual or group. This was a 
practical concept, and it seems to have entailed a 
minimum of conflicts. If a.Masai made a spear, or 
if a Kikuyu built a hut, they were his. However, the 
materials used, in making the objects belonged to no 
one. Among the Luo, any family might fish in a 
certain stream, but if a clan or a group of families 
built a fishing canoe, it alone had a right to use 
that boat. Among the Kamba and the Kalenjin, the harvest 
belonged to those who had planted the seeds. These social 
"laws" were upheld by the chief of the elders.
A spirit of social responsibility was also common 
to all tribes. If, for example, a member of a family 
was in need of help, all individuals were willing and
ready to help. The survival df the family and the 
tribe depended on helpfulness and cooperation. Greed, 
as it is understood in materialist terms today, was 
seldom present among the tribes. Thus, while each 
person maintained his individuality, he never did » 
so to the detriment of his community.
The tribal social life manifested itself at four 
levels. First of all, the intimate bonds of clan kin­
ship afforded numerous opportunities for close fellow­
ship within each family and between families.. People 
enjoyed eating together, and hospitality was a norm of 
life. There was constant interchange of gifts between 
members of each family and between families. Everyone 
agreed that for the general-good of the community, it 
was better to give than to receive. Such rules of 
hospitality were only within the tribe.
The second level of social life took place at the 
community level. The entire community shared in an 
annual cycle of social and political events: victory
celebrations, dances, dissemination of all important 
news, and in frequent marriage or initiation ceremonies.
The third level of social organization was natural 
outcomes of the strong spirit of social cooperation 
and identification of the individual in his community. 
Community activities were played out in a heightened 
sense at the tribal level: craft displays, huge dances,
warrior adulation, games, and the like.
18/
The process of politics in African tribes has been 
described by Busia, a sociologist and former President 
of Ghana;
African communities, or tribes, developed 
their own political systems before the period of 
colonization . . .  . Some communities and tribes
had highly developed political organizations with 
hierarchies of office holders, from attendants to 
Kings and Chiefs wielding varying degrees*of 
authority. Each organization was one.in which 
different individuals played different roles, and 
everyone had some degree of participation in 
political life; for political organization was an 
aspect of the social life in which everyone par-
o
ticipated.°
The most important basis of the political system 
was., of course the tribe. The tribal government was 
based on tribal principles. Within this same framework, 
kinship relations with fellow tribesmen were an impor­
tant base for political action. All Kenya tribes were 
ruled by a Chief, elected or hereditary, or by repre­
sentatives to a council of elders. As an example the 
Kikuyu system of government as described by Kenyatta 
is as follows;
19
. .. . it was based on true democratic 
principles. Each village appointed a represen­
tative to the Council, and in order to maintain 
harmony in the government in the country, it was 
necessary to make a few rules which would act £.s 
the guiding principles in the new government .- . .
The government should be in the hands of council of , 
elders chosen from all members of the community who 
had reached the age of leadership.9
The tribe was in a total , sense, an administrative 
entity which contained a structure for central political 
control. The rulers (elders, chiefs) acted in conformity 
with the laws of the tribe. In cases of-any deviation 
from those laws, the communities imposed.fines on their 
rulers or Impeached them from office. No tribe came 
under the direct control of another tribe.
The chiefs and the elders also had connections within 
the tribe which served as an important base for political 
control. These connections were established and main­
tained through a rudimentary type of political organiza­
tion, operating mostly through the kinship system. 
Interestingly wealth was of great importance in attaining 
political power. The word of the richest man usually 
commanded greater attention than that of the not so rich. 
The rich were., in fact, the chiefs and the elders.
Another important. aspectJiof tribal, life related 
to the methods of trade used by the tribes. A casual 
investigation shows similar economic values among all 
tribal communities. Each individual or family unit 
produced nearly all the necessities of life for consump­
tion. Direct exchange in trading existed, but ther-e was 
no common denominator in which to express the value of 
products. Thus, the tribes used a barter system. For 
example, if an individual wanted to sell commodity A 
for commodity B, it was necessary to determine the worth 
of unit A before, accepting a B unit. This required 
expressing the value of commodity A in terms of the value 
of commodity B, and vice versa. This in turn required 
mental calculations by the owner of each commodity as 
well as endless bargaining which consumed both time 
and energy. It was also necessary to repeat the process 
when trading commodities A for C, D, E, and so forth.
In recent times the creation of the Republic of 
Kenya resulted In the fourth level of social organiza­
tion- -the republic. This republic was thus a con­
glomerate of tribes; the tribes were located in'one 
area or another, and were comprised of family groups 
that lived across the tribal land that they considered 
their own. The members defined themselves by the tribes 
to which they belonged, perhaps as much or more than' by 
their family affinities. As a consequence, their 
tribal bonds became absolute. These bonds and
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traditions were, so strong-that they encouraged dis­
crimination against all non-tribal strangers whether. 
they be black or white.
Tribal boundaries before colonialism were fairly 
vague. Each tribe seems to have claimed only the land 
actually used by its members for cultivation and grazing. 
Big stretches of uninhabited land and thick forests 
divided them from their neighbors. When war threatened,' 
the land was marked to show boundaries of some kind.
This also demonstrated how deeply the people were 
attached to their own territory.
In his book, Facing Mt. Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta argues 
that the cause of friction among tribes was economic.
There was no war of annexation of territory 
or subjection.of one tribe to another . . .  . The
Masai, whose lives depended entirely on the meat,
t
milk, and blood of animals, were forced by 
necessity to raid the stock of their neighbors or 
die of hunger and starvation. 10
Hostilities also consisted of feuds resulting from 
woman-stealing and mere tribal suspicion. Once revenge 
had been taken, a series of reprisals and counter 
reprisals might follow. There were also occasions when 
a tribe would form an alliance with members of a warring 
tribe to raid fellow tribesmen. With regard , to tribe 
relations, Kenyatta stated;
In.territories where friendly relationship 
was established, especially between the Kaptei 
Masai and the southern Kikuyu, the warriors of 
the two tribes joined together to invade another 
section of Masai, like Loita or a section of Gikuyu, 
like Mbeere or Tharaka. ^
In spite of occasional alliances such as these, 
the Kikuyus were, always fighting with the Masai.
Although some aspects of tribal structure were 
seriously affected by colonialism, regional isolation, 
intertribal warfare, and tribal loyalties continued 
after independence. When the government set the goals 
and objectives for development, the characteristics of 
personal allegiance to customs, loyalty to the family 
(defined in terms of a unit of close relatives), and 
loyalty to the tribe were still the strongest bonds 
felt by individuals. This placed sharp limitations on 
the political leaders working for a more balanced growth. 
Long standing jealousies, tribal feuds, group loyalties 
and the like were never seriously influenced by the new 
government. Even though the post-colonial governments 
tried to lessen the impact of tribalism, the system still 
persists. In his writing on the "detribalized" African, 
Max Gluckman makes the following point:
[the] African is always tribalized, both 
in towns, and in rural areas; but he is tribalized 
in two quite different ways. As we see it, in the 
rural areas he lives and is controlled in every 
activity in an organized system of tribal
relations; in the urban areas tribal attachments
1 2work within a setting.of urban association.
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THE BEGINNING OF COLONIALISM
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
more than ninety percent of the African continent 
was ruled hy Africans. By 1900, all but a small 
fraction of it was under European rule. The lives of 
.the Africans started being deeply affected by the 
changes brought about by the foreign rulers.
The Colonial period in Africa lasted well
over eighty years. The first thirty years of this
period may be called the years of establishment,
the next thirty may be called the years of active.
development, and the last twenty may be called the
13years of retreat. v In this chapter, the writer will 
deal with the years of establishment from the point of 
view of the British government and from the point of 
view of the Kenya Africans. The years of active 
development focus on economic and political events 
during this period and their impact on the African 
population.
■Finally, the writer will'address the question of 
African nationalism that led to Kenya's independence. 
Kenya was by far the most troubled territory in British
East Africa and offers an -interesting evaluation in 
political and social conditions which are necessary 
in, testing the thesis.
There are several theories regarding the justifi­
cation of European colonialism in Africa.'
F. D. Lugard who epitomised other pioneers of - 
colonialism in East Africa informed his countrymen in 
I893 of the following:
The "Scramble for. Africa" by the nations of
Europe--an incident parallel in the history of
the world--was due to the growing commercial
rivalry which brought home to the civilized nations
the vital necessity of securing the only remaining
fields -for industrial enterprise and expansion.
It is well, then, to realize that it is for our
advantage--and not alone at the dictates of duty--
that we have undertaken responsibilities in East
Africa. It is in order to foster the growth of
this country, and to find an outlet for our
manufacturers and our surplus energy, that our
farse-eing statesmen and our commercial men advocate
1A
colonial expansion.
Lugard went on further with his enunciation;
There are some who say we have no right in 
Africa at all, that it belongs to the natives. I
26
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hold that our right is the necessity that is upon 
us to provide for our ever-growing population-- 
either by opening new fields of emigration, or 
by providing work and employment which the 
development of overseas extention entails--and 
to stimulate trade by finding new markets.^
The argument, therefore, is that British colonialism 
in East Africa was based in terms of material advantages 
beneficial to England. In Lugard's spirited argument, 
colonialism is represented as a consequence of British 
capitalist expansion, its aim and result being the coloni­
zation of East Africa irrespective of the injustices of 
economic and political domination over the native tribes. 
This theory is of special interest since it identifies 
colonialism with capitalist exploitation.
The second theory which is of some interest to this 
study shows different reasons and motives for colonialism. 
The theory of innate superiority of certain races and 
innate inferiority of others has been advocated to 
justify colonialism.
In his book Ethics of Empire, 1896, H. H. Wyatt, 
with special reference to Africa, wrote:
To us [[i.e., the British^] and not to others, a 
certain definite duty has been assigned: to carry
light and civilization into the dark places of the
27
world, to touch the.mind!' of Asia and of Africa 
with the ethical ideas of Europe to thronging 
millions who would■otherwise never know peace 
and security-, their first conditions of human, 
advance. ^  ^
Wyatt's ideals must he greeted with skepticism.
A few missionaries with a sense of true mission came 
to some parts of Africa. The point, however, is that 
individual motivations of these few people should not 
he confused with British colonial policies. It was 
wider imperial interests which led Britain to occupy 
East Africa.
According to a famous British scholar, colonial 
acquisition of Kenya was tied to England's imperialist 
policies elsewhere in Africa. Colin Cross explains 
that British entanglement in Africa resulted, in part, 
from her entanglement in India. He says;
Africa lay on the way to India and whether 
the route was around the Cape or through the Suez 
Canal it was regarded as essential to prevent 
hostile European powers establishing bases there. 
This was as much a rationalization as an operative 
cause; but pushful British pioneers on the spot 
could always claim London's support by using the 
argument of communications with India. The most 
obvious chain of conquest on these lines had been
28
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that in East Africa.. • To!iprotect the Suez Canal,
it was regarded as essential to control Egypt.
To control Egypt it was essential to control
the hinterland, Sudan. To control Sudan and
the source of the Nile, on which Egypt depended,
it was necessary to have a railway running from
the East Coast. To control the railway, it was
necessary to control Kenya, the territory which
17the railway crossed.
Apart from the simplicity of Cross' reasoning, there 
are several important facts to remember. First of all, 
the Indian Empire was not threatened.
Secondly, Africa was still "the dark continent."
In his book African Discovery, published in 1942,
J. Simmons describes the physical condition of Africa 
as follows;
. . . Africa is extremely uninviting. Vast
stretches of it hardly afford even a sheltering 
roadstead, and good natural harbours are very 
rare. Nearly half of it.is baked by desert or 
semi-desert; much of the rest by thick forest, 
difficult or impossible to penetrate. Few of the 
rivers are navigable."
According to Simmons, it appears that Cross' 
argument is specious and superficial. East Africa was
not strategically located-for1 Britain to mount a 
useful defense for India's security.
Other views of British expansion were given in the 
Times of London of September 28, I892. In defense of 
British occupation of East Africa, the paper stated,, 
the. following;
. . . any withdrawal would be nothing short
of a national calamity. It would mean not only 
the Loss of great capital already expended, but 
the destruction of our influence and prestige 
throughout Central Africa . . . whether we desire
it or not, the British East African Company must 
be identified for all practical purposes with 
national policy.^
According to the Times, then, the reasons for 
British occupation of East Africa were more important 
than .the countries themselves. The motives for’ the 
occupation were political and economic. Other theories 
of "higher purposes" or'civilizing mission" were only 
necessary to help clear the way for this expansion.
Professor Albert Szymarski, a distinguished student 
of European colonialism, well expressed the reasons for 
European expansion.
30*
The pressure for the' political expansion of 
Europe came primarily from the desire of the 
landowning class to increase their expansion, 
wealth, and power.
A secondary dynamic of colonialism in thi§ 
stage was the growing need for raw materials t-o . 
satisfy the increasing demands of the growing
o n
urban population.
The desire for expansion led to the formal establish- 
ment of a British protectorate over Kenya in 1895* In 
1920, Kenya became a British Colony.
The word "protectorate" means an area over which 
some.stronger power exercises authority while allowing 
the natives some forms of nominal command. The natives 
are forbidden to have direct diplomatic relations with
an outside state, and all foreign powers may only deal
21with natives through the protecting government.
The greatest political advantage of this arrangement 
is that it allows the protecting power to get obedience 
from the natives while providing a convenient excuse 
when things fail to work out.
The word "colonial" as used in the political sense 
is characterized by heavy settlement. It consists of 
settlers who form autonomous government while maintaining 
economic and cultural- links with their homelands. A 
colonial relationship is therefore created when one-
31
nation establishes and maintains political domination 
over a geographically external political unit inhabited 
- by others.
The British protectorate over and the eventual 
colonization of Kenya were effected through two
t*
complimentary methods; the first of which was■chicanery. 
The tribes were promised British protection in exchange 
for their surrender and cession of their territory.
Due to a lack of knowledge in international affairs, 
some tribes yielded to these ambiguous, vague and 
meaningless promises, thereby losing their sovereignty. 
Loss of territories led to the conclusion of various 
treaties with Britain.
L. T. L. Oppenheimer, on the effect of treaties 
in international laws, makes the following statement:
Although a treaty was concluded with real 
consent of the parties, it is, nevertheless, not 
binding if the consent was given in error or 
under a delusion produced by a fraud of the 
other contracting party.
Thus, it can be argued that the British, through 
a process of pious fraud, duped the tribes into 
relinquishing their territorial sovereignty. It is 
perhaps just as well to make a general observation that 
contacts between Christian missionaries and the natives,
especially those missionaries Who wanted to see the 
country under British rule, had considerable effect 
in mollifying the attitudes of the natives towards the 
colonizing power.
The second method involved the use of British 
military force against those tribes which resisted t-he 
entire colonial system. The reasons for military con­
frontation have been described by Tignor:'
In the first place, the British had military
and technological superiority. The major period
when military force was in continuous use was the
so-called era of pacification. At that time, the
British used violence in an exemplary fashion,
hoping to render its further use unnecessary.
When the British sent forces against recalcitrant
groups, they inflicted severe military lessons,
burning villages, expropriating livestock, and in
some cases, killing large numbers. These forays
were designed to demonstrate, not only to the
people against whom they were sent, but to the
neighbors as well, that resistence was futile and
24rained down intolerable destruction.
One other way British achieved its intentions was 
by shrewdly manipulating tensions within the tribe, 
finding important collaborators before launching a
military attack. In spite of"military defeats, 
anti-colonial-disturbances among tribes continued. 
These were in the form of scattered quasi- 
guerrilla skirmishes during the years 1895 through 
1920.
After 1920, some tribes, especially the 
Kikuyus, continued to seek direct confrontation in 
the form of land struggles, labor strikes, and 
occasional acts of violence.
After Kenya was declared a colony, a network 
of British and native administrators was rapidly 
provided. This was in the form of indirect rule.
The governor ruled through district commissioners 
who ruled through indigenous tribal groupings headed 
by a chief. The basic hypothesis of' indirect rule 
was that through creating two sets of rulers--British 
and native, working either separately or in cooperation 
(in which the native chiefs had well-defined duties 
and an acknowledged status)--a minimization of conflicts 
and retention of the efficient organizational structure 
of traditional life would result.
The general control principles were laid down 
by Lord Lugard in 1922, as follows:
1.• Native rulers are not permitted to raise and 
control armed forces or to .grant permission' 
to carry arms.
2. The sole right to impose taxation in any 
form is reserved to the Suzerain power.
3. The right to legislation is reserved.
4. The ^ right to appropriate land on
equitable terms for public purposes 
and for commercial purposes is vested 
in the governors.
5* The right of conforming or otherwise
deciding the choice of the people of
the successor to a Chieftain and of 
deposing any ruler for misrule or .other 
cause is reserved to the governor, 
f Succession is governed^] by native 
law and custom, subject m  the case of 
important chiefs to the approval of 
the governor in order that the most 
capable claimant may be chosen.
Politically, the concept of indirect rule 
achieved two goals: a total belief in the colonial
government and the foreign advancement of a political 
system over the natives. Similarly, Lugard said 
the following:
If continuity and decentralization are as 
I have said, the first and most important 
conditions in maintaining an effective adminis­
tration cooperation is the key-note of success 
in its application-continuous cooperation 
between every link in the chain, from the head 
of the administration to its most junior members- 
cooperation between the government and the 
commercial community, and above all, between 
the provincial staff and the native rulers.
Every individual adds his share not only to the
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accomplishment of the- ideal, hut to the ideal 
itself. Its principles are fashioned by his 
patient and loyal application of these 
principles, with as little interference 
as possible with native customs and mode of 
thought.^
Lugard's argument, misplaced as it is, overlooks 
two fundamental facts. First of all, it does not 
take into account that the system of "continuous 
cooperation" and "decentralization" achieved the 
unquestionable authority of the British Crown.
In the second place, this argument ignores the 
fact that the system also shifted the focus of authority 
away from the legitimate traditional society to those 
of British power. The chiefs, whose powers were 
traditionally balanced through the process of consul­
tation with the tribes, became petty tyrants making a 
mockery of their beliefs and ruled only because they 
had the British force to keep themselves in power.
This in turn disabled the political sub-structures 
of the tribes, slowly diminishing the traditional 
values of their democracy. Another consequence of 
the "indirect rule" system of government was that it 
subordinated the tribes to the British.
Being politically disorganized and unable to 
continue effective resistance against the British, 
the tribes faced the challenge of European settlement 
on their land.
Jidlaph G. Kamoche described the manner in 
which the African tribes lost their land:
As African land was alienated to Europeans, 
it became nominally part of the highlands if 
the land was 4,000 feet above sea level . . .
when a need arose for the colonial government 
to put to public use a part of the African 
land a method called "exclusion" was employed 
to alienate the desired land.^
Large amounts of African land were appropriated
by the' Europeans between 1903-19H* The colonial
government established two types of applicants that
could apply for this land. Those in the first group,
called Class A, were men of small means and were to
be given small grants of small farms. Those in Class
B were men with Ji 1000 capital and an assured income
of <£ 200 per year. Farms were also available to this
group for purchase on generous terms. Using this method
of land distribution, a total of 1,052 Class B farms
27and 257 Class- A farms were created. This produced 
bitter and violent episodes against the colonial
government,, especially from- the' Kikuyu, Maasai, 
and Kamba tribes.
In an attempt to resolve the land problems, 
the colonial government created "African Reserves” 
as a form of compensation for lost land. These 
were designated forest areas which separated European 
settlers from the African tribes. In spite, of 
British efforts to resolve the land grievances, the 
tribes remained bitter.
In his study of Gikuyu tribal organization, Jomo 
Kenyatta underlined the .importance of land in the 
African culture.
. . , Land is the key to the people's life;
it secures for them that peaceful tillage of the 
soul which supplies their material needs and 
enables them to perform their magic and 
traditional ceremonies in undisturbed serenity 
facing M t . Kenya . . .  it supplies them with the 
material needs of life, through which spiritual 
and. mental contentment is achieved. Communion 
with the ancestral spirits is perpetuated 
through contact with the soul in which the 
ancestors of the tribe lie buried . . . the earth 
is the mother of the tribe . . . As it is, by 
driving him off his ancestral lands, the 
Europeans have robbed him of the material
foundations of his culture,, and reduced him
2 o
to a state of serfdom forever . . .
It was the intensification of such land beliefs 
which later posed a challenge to European colonization 
of the country.
In brief, about one quarter of the land, repre­
senting most of the fertile upland territory, was 
held by Europeans and was termed "White Highlands."
The Africans remained bitter over the land issue and 
gave the colonial government continuous trouble 
throughout the colonial period.
Closely connected with the land issue was the 
procurement of African labor for European farms.
The European settlers viewed the African landlessness 
as a source of cheap farm labor.
Due to the African's resentment concerning the 
land issue and their unwillingness to work on European 
settlements, the colonial government levied a "Hut 
and Poll Tax" on all African male adults. The payment 
of this tax required the Africans to work. Punitive 
measures such as imprisonment and brutal and ruthless 
beatings were used on those Africans who failed to pay 
the tax.
Complicating the land and tax issues were the low 
wages which Africans received from European settlers. 
The colonial administration linked African taxes and
low wages as positive factors rtecessary for economic 
development. For European settlers, African labor 
was essential in the development of opportunity and 
potentiality of agriculture (such as coffee, tea, wheat, 
and corn). The justification used in support of African 
labor by the colonial administration was that the 
initiative, knowledge, and industrialization of Europe 
were needed in the colony and consequently the Africans 
would benefit.
The Africans viewed this.in terms of .ruthless con­
fiscation of their land. They argued that, by being 
forced to work, the colonial government made it impossible 
for them to live otherwise. They saw little reason to 
work beyond the time needed to secure money for the. 
payment of taxes and thus repeatedly deserted from 
European farms.
Another consequence of African labor was the intro­
duction of European agriculture methods to the Africans. 
This created a tremendous hardship upon the Africans' 
traditional lifestyle of subsistence agriculture.
The European settlers, however, expected the Africans 
to emulate the model of high production and efficiency 
and consequently assure themselves a share of the 
affluence believed to be the reward of superior 
knowledge.
Together with the land issue, British economic 
policies in the colony were conditioned by her desire 
to become a major manufacturing and capitalist ex­
porting country. This desire was greatly intensified 
by the effects of World War I, which had suddenly 
exposed her competitive weakness. This in turn 
heightened the importance of creating new markets which 
could be directly controlled through the colonial system. 
Britain had also accepted large loans from the United 
States, which resulted in economic and political
dominance of the United States in areas once dominated 
30by Britain. The following statement from the Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster explains this fact.
. . . Remember that by the service of our debt
to America we have to find many millions a year, 
and at the same time we have to purchase raw 
materials from America amounting to many millions 
a year.
Every single pound that we can take off the 
American exchange so much the better for us, 
especially if it is spent within the British 
Empire. The development'of cotton, sugar, and 
tobacco--all these are matters of the utmost 
importance, not only in providing our .own people 
here with employment, but they are essential 
because if it is essential to purchase these
commodities they should he purchased from our 
own people.^
The commodities referred to above came from British 
exports from her own markets at home and those under 
colonial rule. The colonies were capable of producing 
tropical raw materials required for British industries 
■and the colonial economies were controlled by Britain 
with her own interests in mind. This view was confirmed 
in 1923 by members of the British Empire Cotton Growing 
Corporation.
I believe we shall in the future see the whole 
of our cotton coming from our own dominions,
£i.e. Empire].. I believe we shall thus secure 
cheaper cotton, cheaper raw materials for the use 
of our British manufacturers. I also believe that 
in doing that we will be supplying a market for 
our own people beyond the seas, and that the money 
that they obtain for their cotton may to a great 
extent be spent in making purchases from the mother 
country.
It is an ideal for which we all ought to work,
that the money obtained from us should in a different
form come back to this country. When we are able to
do that we are really though separated by thousands
32of miles, an Empire united and strong.
This view assumed a na*tura'l harmony of economic
unity between the mother country and the colony.
British investment in the colony would speed rapid
development of essential primary products; and in turn
11create the desired markets for overseas exports. J
L. S. Amery, a British economist of the period, 
explained the multiple virtues of this economic 
system in the following manner:;
I think we have never realized sufficiently 
the immense economic possibilities of those 
colonies, and the immense wealth that could be 
created by science, energy, and organization 
in those parts of the world. The prime object, 
of course, of that development must be the 
welfare of the inhabitants of those regions.
Our first duty is to them; our object is not 
to exploit them, but to enable them materially, 
as well as in every other respect, to rise to a 
high plane of living and civilization. But I 
am sure as I stand.here that we cannot 
develop them and help them without an over­
spill of wealth and prosperity that would 
be an immense help to this country in the 
difficult times ahead.
^3
i
In Kenya, this system required the establishment of 
an export-oriented infrastructure capable of producing 
products in demand on world markets such as coffee, 
cotton, tea, wheat, etc.
The economic ideology also required that 
.colonial development be confined to forms of 
production which would not compete with British 
manufacturers as colonial consumers preferred 
British commodities, however uncompetitive.
T'his committment was justified in terms of the 
interests of the local economy since it gave -access 
to the world markets and was believed that this 
would advance the economic well-being of the 
natives. 335
Since the colonial economy was entirely constructed 
according to the wishes of and for the benefit of the 
home country, the railroad and other modes of transpor­
tation and communication were developed to facilitate 
the centralization and exportation of agricultural 
products.
In addition, economic and social infrastructures 
were created for the benefit of the large European- 
owned import-export companies and for the.convenience 
of the Europeans.
At the other end, land in the African reserves did 
not benefit from these economic arrangements because the
colonial government had decreed that Africans were 
forbidden from planting cash crops on their land.
Also, their land did not benefit from any of the 
improvements settlers made on their farms.
Economic activities in the industrial sector 
involved only the transformation of agricultural 
products for overseas markets.
In both the agricultural and industrial 
sectors, no minimum salary was set; employers 
were free to set salaries for their employees.
About a third of African salary was represented 
by payments in kind: lodgings and small pieces
of land to grow food crops.
Racism accentuated, the differences in living 
conditions between Europeans and Africans. African 
salaries appeared phenomenally low. The average 
annual salary was about two hundred dollars in 
1961 as against three thousand five hundred 
dollars for the Europeans. Equally large planta­
tions, cheap labor, and high yields assured very 
comfortable revenue for their owners.
In the public sector, the European earned 
about $^200 annually and the African $300, Racial 
discrimination had also imposed limits of social 
mobility for the Africans, and while the Europeans
filled the highest jobs,^the Africans were 
the manual workers.33
Thus, the system of colonial economy entirely 
founded on business profit and for the benefit of the 
Europeans created unbearable economic difficulties 
and unjust social treatment of the Africans. The 
system was also responsible for creating a political 
system which was designed to protect the economic 
interests of the Europeans at the expense of the 
Africans. With that in mind, it is my purpose to 
analyze briefly events which led to African nationalism 
and independence.
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AFRICAN OPPOSITION AND INDEPENDENCE
As discussed before in this study, the Africans 
had a striking record of uprisings since the beginning 
of colonialism. There were small-scale rebellions 
which never culminated "in major revolts partly because 
of European readiness to suppress them. At first 
their uprisings centered on the Africans' resentment 
of European settlements. But later numerous grievances 
brought Africans into major conflicts with the Europeans. 
The root problem, as mentioned earlier, was the land 
issue. Other grievances were socio-economic and 
political.
In 1920, the first African political associa­
tion known as the Young Kikuyu Association was 
founded. It voiced grievances over land, taxation, 
and the regulation of 1920 which made carrying a 
pass--the Kipande--obligatory for all African 
adult males. The association demanded resti­
tution to. the tribe of land occupied by the Euro­
peans and facilities to develop the economic well 
being of the Africans, it also demanded direct 
African representation in the European controlled 
legislative council.
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The association also accused the chiefs of being 
government stooges. The founder of the association,
Harry Thuku, expressed.his anger with the Europeans 
in 1921:
I, Harry Thuku, am greater than you 
Europeans, I am even greater than the chiefs 
of this country. How is it that I have left 
Nairobi without being arrested if it is not 
because I am a great man. I desire if the 
Europeans tell you to do any owrk at all, that 
you tell them Harry Thuku has refused to allow 
you to make camps, or to make roads, or to work 
in the station or for the public works' depart­
ment . . . Hearken, everyday you pay hut tax
to the European government 0 Where is it sent?
It is their task to steal the property of the 
39Agikuyu.
Thuku's campaign against colonial injustices was 
short lived. He was exiled the following year, and it 
was not until 1924 that the Kikuyu Central Association 
(KCA) was formed to carry on with Thuku's campaign.
Jomo Kenyatta became its general secretary. The 
Association sent him to England the same year and again- 
in 1931 to air their grievances. Kenyatta faithfully 
reflected the Kikuyu rejection of European domination 
and values by later writing his book, Facing Mount 
Kenya.
In an article entitled "An African Looks at British 
Imperialism,'' which appeared in the January, 1933 issue 
of the Negro. Worker in England,' Kenyatta took an 
offensive stand by criticizing British policies in 
Kenya. He wrote:
Kenya is the.most important British Colony
in East Africa. During the last 35 years, these
people have been robbed of their best land and
are today reduced to the statue of serfs forced
to work on their own lands for the benefit of
the "white owners," and in some circumstances to
40work without pay and food.
Kenyatta argued that British imperialism supported
the backward form of social relationships in Kenya and
that the British had succeeded in breaking tribal
organizations and felt no need to listen to the opinions
4lof the Africans. He argued further that the Africans
were worse off under the British than they had been
h  n . .
under their own tribal systems. ^ H e accused the British
of levying taxes on Africans many times over in order to
pay for a huge colonial budget that dwarfed the layout
43of the colonial government m  Kenya. J He also argues 
that the Africans had to pay the cost of modernization 
without receiving any of the benefit's. Roads and rail­
roads for which the Africans paid so dearly in both
labor and taxes did nothing toJ)improve African con­
ditions, but made it possible for British merchants to
accumulate and export Kenya's resources for their own
. 4 4  . .profits. To.Kenyatta, this did not represent African
development. He viewed settled plantations as places
where landless Africans had to go to slave and die
because their land had been given to the British men
4 5by the colonial government.
Kenyatta wanted to throw off the chains of British 
colonialism and create a new democratic African 
society.
Between 1928-1945, many articles by Kenyatta 
appeared in African national newspapers abroad, and by 
the time he returned to Kenya in- 1946, he had already 
become a world famous African politician. Following 
his return, Kenyatta devoted himself to the task of 
building KCA to a Kenya wide African political party. 
Over time, he developed personal relationships with 
leaders from other tribes. Notably, Oginga-Odinga, 
Achieng Oneko, and Paul Ngei. This team was very 
successful in arousing the minds of the people by 
stirring up hatred against the British and by their 
calls for political freedom. Wherever they went, 
Africans poured into the meetings to hear~them. 
Especially when Kenyatta rose to speak, the people 
listened in complete silence and rapt attention.
Kenyatta used examples to explain himself.-
He would contrast the rich European way of life
in Kenya with the exploitation of Africans.
Kenyatta was also reported to say one thing
openly in a public meeting and then take his
tribesmen off by themselves where he spoke
l±6in.Kikuyu idioms.
The colonial government suspected that the Mau
Mau movement was born out of these secret meetings.
/
Kenyatta was also referred to by the colonial
government as the "most accomplished agitator of all
the Africans." In fact, by the time Kenyatta returned
to Kenya, he was regarded by the Europeans as their
greatest enemy, and they accused him of thoughtless
opposition to administrative policies which were aimed
Zj-7at improving the conditions of the Africans. ( This 
was much the same language the Europeans had used 
since he became the president of the KCA.
In 1953 > KAU was banned. The colonial authori­
ties could not conceive of any political opposition 
to their policies, nor could they accept the
reality of African aspirations strongly advocated
48by Kenyatta and other African leaders.
They viewed these activities as destructive 
and continued to believe that any solution to 
the African problems lay in the initiative of 
the colonial administration under European 
.leadership, not in changing the political system 
as Africans demanded. While some African leaders 
believed in political changes, under this situa­
tion, Kikuyu resistance to colonial rule became 
increasingly militant and more committed to the 
use of force to achieve social, economic, and 
political change. The gap between the colonial
authorities and the Kikuyus widened as each 
rejected the' assumptions on which the other's 
arguments were based.^
As time passed by, reports of oathing. and a 
movement called Mau Mau appeared. The oathing grew 
out of a need to mobilize support for political 
tactics and to raise the level of unity and political 
committment among the Kikuyus. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, 
himself a Mau Mau detainee, describes the vows and 
promises made by members of the movement in oath- 
taking ceremoniesj
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I speak the truth and vow before our God 
And by this Batuni oath of our movement 
Which is called the movement of fighting 
That if I am called on to kill for our soil 
If I am called on to shed my blood for it 
I shall obey and I shall never surrender 
And if I fail to go
May this oath kill me,
May this he-goat kill me,
May this seven kill me,
May this meat kill me.
I speak the truth and vow before our God
And before our people of Africa
That I shall never betray our country
That I shall never betray anybody of this movement to
to the enemy 
Whether the enemy be European or African 
And if I do this
May this oath kill me, etc.
I speak the truth and vow before our God 
And by this Batuni oath of our movement
That I shall never sell my country for money or
any other thing 
That I shall abide until my death by all the promises 
that I have made this day 
That I shall never disclose our secrets to our enemy 
Nor shall I disclose them to anybody who does not 
belong to the movement 
And if I transgress against any of the vows that I 
have thus consciously made 
I shall agree to any punishment that the movement 
shall decide to give me 
And if I fail to do these things
May this oath kill me, e t c .  50
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At the same time, po.l-itidal activities among other 
tribes assumed various•forms, such as labor strikes, 
political demonstrations and selective political violence.
These activities made it clear to the colonial govern­
ment that the idea of "freedom" was common to all Africans. 
In spite of these developments, the colonial government’s 
.attitudes did not change much, and a declaration of a 
"state of emergency" was declared in October, 1952.
The oathing and a state of emergency accelerated 
the Kikuyu exodus to the forests where they ambushed 
and killed European settlers with the help of Kikuyu 
employees. African collaborators, especially colonial 
chiefs, were killed.
The colonial government believed that by locking 
up African leaders, this would in turn disable the 
movement, and Kenyatta and other prominent Africans 
were detained. This, however, did not stop the movement 
but rather precipitated more violent resistance through­
out the country.
Although perhaps a military defeat, the move­
ment was a great political success resulting in 
greater flexibility of colonial leadership in meeting 
African demands.
The initial flexibility occurred in 195^ when 
"principles of multiracialism" were incorporated 
into what was called, the "Lyttelton Constitution." 
The following year African political associa­
tions, on a district level, were permitted, hut 
the Kikuyus were barred from political activity.
The non-violent African leadership fell to other 
tribes.
In 1957» six Africans were elected to the Legisla­
tive Council. They used this opportunity to press for 
greater political concessions from Britain. The aim 
was to pressure the British for a constitutional 
conference which would lead to independence.
By i960, there were fourteen African members of 
the Legislative council, including such men as Oginga 
Odinga, Tom Mboya, James Gichuru, Julius Kiano, Ronald 
Ngala, and Daniel Moi. ' The African members of the 
Legislative Council decided to form a national political 
party and bring all tribal political associations under 
a single political union. The Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) was launched in i960, and James Gichuru, 
a Kikuyu, was elected its president on the understanding 
that he was only holding the seat for Kenyatta.
Oginga Odinga was elected Vice President. Mboya 
became its general secretary, but Ngala, a politician 
from the Coast Province chose not to join. Moi Kalenjin.,
also refused to join KANU. . The reasons these men did 
not join KANU were perhaps justifiable in that, once 
independence .was won, they feared the Kikuyus would 
secure political dominance.
In the same year Ngala formed the Kenya 
African Democratic■Union (KADU) which was joined 
by Moi's Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Masai 
United Front, the Kenya African Peoples Party, the 
Coast African Political Union, and the Somali 
National Front.
The KADU objective was to work towards a
multi-racial self government within the existing
political system. The most significant aspect of
this was that the party represented the people who
felt that their interests would be threatened by a
53kikuyu and Luo dominated alliance. '
KANU was demanding a fresh constitutional 
conference and new elections. KANU also demanded 
the "unconditional" release of Kenyatta under 
whose leadership it would form a predominently 
African government.
Each party was pressing for a constitutional 
structure most likely to secure it in power, but despite 
their political differences, both parties agreed to work 
together as a team on most issues of African independence.
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A formal expression of this agreement was adopted when 
the group visited Kenyatta at Lodwar.
This meeting of KANU and KADU delegates 
at- Lodwar under the chairmanship of the national 
leader Jomo Kenyatta and attended by fellow-freedom- 
fighters Paul Ngei, B. M. Kaggia and Peter Kigondu 
unanimously resolved:
1. That unity among all Africans is essential 
for our struggle towards independence
and should be pursued relentlessly.
2. That meantime it is agreed that KANU and 
KADU work together and in full consultation 
as from today on the immediate questions of
(a) immediate and unconditional release of 
Kenyatta;
(b) full independence for Kenya in 1961.
3. The meeting being convinced that personali­
ties and selfishness, mutual suspicion and 
fears may be at the bottom of current mis­
understandings and disunity, calls on all 
African people and members of Legislative 
Council and party leaders to completely 
refrain from those negative and disruptive 
attitudes, and work together for the good 
of Kenya.
ty.. That to pursue the above, the meeting 
recommends the setting up of a joint 
. consultative committee of the KANU 
Governing Council and KADU Supreme 
Council and their respective parlia­
mentary groups to facilitate greater 
cooperation and collaboration and 
closer association. 5 5
In August of 1961, Jomo Kenyatta was released. .He 
immediately became KANU's president.
KADU, on the other hand, was becoming in­
creasingly popular with European settlers and, on 
the. whole, repudiated Ken yatta's leadership. 7
This period also marked a phase of communication 
between the Africans and the British government. A series 
of constitutional conferences both in Kenya and London 
were called where British officials and African leaders 
talked about constitutional changes.
KADU's plan at these meetings was devised by European 
supporters, essentially to protect prevailing land rights 
and to prevent political domination over the weaker groups 
by KANU.
In the Lancaster House Conference attended by 
Kenyatta, KADU's plan was strongly supported, not 
just by the Europeans but also by the British
government. In the end,. I^ /VNU abandoned its own 
plan and accepted a British version of the KADU 
. plan, providing for a bi-cameral legislature and 
for six regional assemblies. This would have 
entrenched political powers but limited financial 
powers. KANU won on through free elections and 
Kenyatta's release. 5 &
In the general elections held in.1961, KANU won 
83 of the 12^ House of Representative seats and won in 
every Province. It also won the majority in the Senate 
and controlled three of the seven regional assemblies, 
namely Central, . Eastern, and Nyanza. KADU's victories 
were in the Coast (Ngala’s territory), the Rift Valley 
(Moi's territory), and the Western Province.
Kenyatta's presence dominated'the whole election. 
Odinga emerged as the number two man in KANU. He had 
a long personal relationship with Kenyatta, but his 
political powers in Luoland were unmatched. Kenyatta 
still, faced political opposition from KADU. His cabinet 
included five Kikuyus, four Luo, and six other tribes 
with one representative each. Apart from Odinga, who 
was Vice-President, all other senior cabinet ministers 
were Kikuyus. Mboya was assigned the ministry of labor.
In the 1963 general elections KANU won.again, and 
in December of that year the country became independent; 
Kenyatta was sworn in as the country's first Prime Minister..
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POST INDEPENDENCE ERA
Kenyans looked to their government with great hopes, 
pride and satisfaction. They believed that the government 
led by fellow Africans would bring fruits of independence 
to all citizens equally. The spiritual leader of the 
independence movement Jomo Kenyatta, was seen as the 
symbol of economic and political justice. He had been 
detained by the colonial government, and had suffered with 
the rest of the citizens. People called him Mzee, a 
swahili word meaning a supreme elder, and as such trusted 
by the people to be a fair and honorable guardian. Even 
the flag represented this spirit. It was composed of red, 
green and black, each color representing the independence 
nationalism. Red blood shed in the years of strife 
towards independence. Green represented the green pas­
tures of the land and black represented the people, inde­
pendent of colonialism. Unfortunately, the hopes of the 
people were short lived. The first year of independence 
was wrought with many changes.
The problem of developing national unity and a 
new sense of national identification which goes 
beyond tribal loyalties is being faced in one after 
another of the countries of Africa, both before and 
after independence--African countries are composed
of many tribal societi.es, ^each with its own history,
loyalties, vested interests and. prejudices. These
societies had expressed no desire for unification;
rather, they have long been divided by suspicion,
57rivalry, or open hostility.
The foregoing observation of William Bascom was no 
less true for Kenya than for other newly independent 
African states. Once independence had been achieved, the 
logic of KANU's leadership evaporated, leaving a residue 
of intertribal animosities and suspicions. Kenyatta. 
recognized the dangers of the disolution of national unity 
and appealed to all Kenyans to perpetuate the unity he had. 
fostered during his leadership of the. national liberation 
struggle. He perceived in the existence of KADU and its 
regionalism a major stumbling block in the realization of 
this goal. Coincidentally, Kenyatta wished to extend his 
personal power beyond his Kikuyu base to the Coast, the Rift 
Valley and Western Province.
In 1964, Kenyatta, then the Prime Minister, engineered 
the establishment of the Republic and his election as 
President. Arguing that KANU and KADU had shared goals, 
and that existence of two competing parties was illogical 
and disfunctional, he also arranged the dissolution of 
KADU, leaving the Kikuyu-dominated KANU as the country's
c' o
only legal political organisation. However, he was clever 
enough to obscure the true intent of Kadu's demise by 
appointing Odinga, a Luo, as Vice President of both KANU
and of Kenya. Tom Mboya, another non-Kikuyu potential 
rival of Kenyatta, was relegated to the insignificant 
post of Minister of Constitutional Affairs. At the 
same time, the most important ministries including those 
for Finance, Economic Planning, Defense, Foreign Affairs, 
Justice, and Land, were assigned to Kikuyus. Currio.usly, 
all but one of Kenyatta's top Kikuyu appointees had little 
involvement with the freedom movement.
This led to accusations of tribalism, especially 
from former KADU leaders, who alleged that the Kikuyu 
were given preferential treatment in both cabinet and 
civil service appointments. Such feelings were shared by 
non-Kikuyu KANU members of parliament. Strong criticism
f*
also came from Kikuyus in Central Province, especially in 
the districts of Nyeri and Muranga. These Kikuyu were 
critical of Kenyatta's ■favoritism toward their kinsmen 
from Kenyatta's home district of Kiambu.
References in parliament to the problem of 
tribalism increased. These references were pre­
dominantly to the alleged dominance of the Kikuyus 
over other tribes. The Kikuyu appeared to many to 
be the major beneficiaries of independence dominating 
both the bureaucracy and the country's economy. So 
explicit did this become that one Luo member of par­
liament felt it necessary to warn that there was no 
place for establishing one clan or one tribe as a ruling 
class in African society. By the end of the year,
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fears of Kikuyu dominance in government and 
therefore control over policy making were 
regularly voiced in and out of parliament.
Widespread criticism also alleged that Kikuyus were' 
dominating the country's economy.
Kenyatta still faced the problem of land distribution 
to the poor, especially concerning those who had lost 
their land in the struggle for Kenya's independence.
Many KANU members of parliament called on the government 
to seize land owned by Europeans for free distribution 
to the landless. They also criticized the government 
for failing to restrict foreigners' ownership of land.
In answering his critics, Kenyatta blamed everything on 
the colonial government. He reiterated his government's 
committment to eliminating all forms of injustice, but 
warned the people that it was impossible for everyone in 
the country to own land. He pointed out that wealth and 
progress could not be achieved overnight or by magic and 
wishful thinking, rather it would come from the physical 
labor of all Kenyans.
Despite these excuses, strong criticisms continued 
charging the government with "Kikuyu corruption," 
blaming it for creating the gap between the haves and 
the have'nots, and calling it anti-democratic.
In response, the government pledged itself to a 
program of modernization and development designed to
63
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ensure an equitab-le distribution of wealth and to 
guarantee political democracy. The most important 
element of the program was that through governmental 
efforts, the African tradition of "mutual social 
responsibility" would play an important role In the 
development of the country, would establish a basis 
for political democracy, and would bring about a 
unified national effort aimed at the goals of develop­
ment. It was the government's function to control the 
whole process and to ensure that progress was made 
according to the dictates of "mutual social responsi­
bility" .
Describing.the virtues of "African Socialism," Tom 
Mboya said:
. . . To make progress toward these fundamental
objectives, we have decided to employ the system 
of African Socialism; we must draw particularly on 
those African roots that are especially among all 
tribes in Kenya: political democracy and mutual
social responsibility. In the traditional African 
society in Kenya only one requirement was imposed 
,on an individual before he could participate fully 
and equally in political affairs. He had to be a 
mature, responsible member of that society and 
nothing else. Indeed, the Constitution already 
guarantees that every person in Kenya is entitled
6A
• *:
to the fundamental rights ^ and freedoms of the 
individual whatever his race, tribal place of 
origin or residence or other local connections, 
political opinion,, color, creed, or sex^-during 
■our struggle for Uhuru, we always asserted that 
only through freedom and human rights could 
the people cooperate fully with the government ^ 
(author's emphasis) . ^
There were three problems with Mboya's idealism. 
First, it ignored the problem of tribalism, the in­
compatible customs and traditions of which fragmented 
Kenyan society.
Tribal antagonisms, which had been encouraged and 
exploited by the colonial government, undermined national 
commitment to KANU's developmental and democratic goals. 
Briefly subordinated to the struggle for national 
liberation, the nefarians affects of tribalism were 
exacerbated by the Kikuyu domination of KANU and the 
national government. The necessary and laudatory goals 
of development and modernization were thus interpreted 
as benefitting only the ruling tribe at the expense of 
the others and subverted any chance of a national con­
sensus on mobilization for these goals.
The second problem was closely related to the first. 
Tribal relations of authority were based on tradition, the 
individual defining his political allegiance in terms of 
the recognized leader of his tribe. Thus, the Kikuyu
were strongly attached to Kenyatta because he was the 
leader of their tribe. Similarly, Oginga Odinga remained 
the undisputed leader.of the Luo despite his relegation 
to. the Vice Presidencies of KANU and the Republic.
Mboya, unrecognized as its leader by any tribe, had 
no traditional claims to authority. In order to achieve 
national mobilization for KANU's developmental goals, 
such traditional definitions of leadership had to be 
replaced'by rational-legal or charismatic basis for 
authority. As leader of the struggle for national 
liberation, Kenyatta may have acquired a rational- 
legal or charismatic legitimacy for.his leadership, 
but the post-independence resurgence of tribalism 
subverted whatever authority that had been thus created, 
leaving only the traditional bases of leadership.
Kenyatta was forced, therefore, to work through tribal 
leaders for the accomplishment of KANU's goals at the 
expense of establishing his legitimacy as the leader 
of Kenya, not just leader of the Kikuyu.
The third problem was related to the difficulty of 
achieving the goals of "African Socialism." and political 
democracy while tribal economic relationships remained 
unmodernized.
The aspect of tribalism always comes info play 
on important roles in the country's political leadership. 
For example, the President has difficulties retaining 
political support from a different tribe without the
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intermediary of tribal leaders.v This was a problem
. A»
which was never recognized as an obstacle to progress. 
While all tribal cultures included the notion of 
"mutual social responsibility", the material benefits 
of traditional collectivism were not distributable 
outside the tribe. The tribal basis for the economic 
ingredients of African socialism, therefore, was 
incomptible with the goals of national economic equity. 
Kikuyus, who dominated both KANU and the government, 
tended to favor other Kikuyus in employment and 
distributing the available resources of Kenya, regardless 
of their kinsmen’s political orientation prior to inde­
pendence. Luos and other tribesmen who were more 
qualified for jobs or who were active in the struggle 
for independence naturally resented such discrimination.
Mboya's idealism, whether the result of naivete 
or delusion, was .exploited by an increasingly cynical 
KANU leadership which gradually subverted whatever 
democracy was left in the organization. Of course, 
they denied any such intent and continued to project 
a party image which was clearly at odds with reality.
Before independence our party was rightly 
geared to the struggle against colonialism. Its 
structure, organization and slogans and even 
mood . . . Now that we are free, we have to
reconstruct the party for the task of nation- 
building, economic freedom, today the party is
*
the government and must teach the people to 
accept, respect and trust the government and its 
officers . . .  To ensure effective working of 
the party . . .  it must he organized to provide 
real and serious dehates on policy* It must
not be just a contest for factions and personali-
^ f,o
ties.
The dichotomy between image and intent becomes more 
striking when one examines the steps KANU's Kikuyu 
leadership took to insure its perpetuation in power.
KADU had been "voluntarily" disolved in 196*1. In 
order to mitigate the fears of the non-kikuyu membership 
of the defunct party, whose suspicion had been raised 
with the increasingly heavy-handed Kikuyu domination 
of Kenyan politics, Kenyatta and his allies sought to 
allocate ceremonial and symbolic authority to members 
of other tribes. In a partial response to an emerging 
left-wing of KANU, the leadership designated Oginga 
Odinga as party Vice President, hoping to defuse the 
Luo leader's strident criticism of the regime
Vice President Odinga became the focal point of 
left wing dissention. A speech he. made in which he 
said "communism is like food to me" was taken as 
significant by many people. He complained that he 
had been stripped of all government power when he 
was appointed Vice President. He became increasingly
critical of other ministers and' in April, 1965, he 
attacked Mboya and Ngala for being tools of Great 
Britain and the United States.^ The ploy did not 
succeed and the leadership began to fear an eventual 
Odinga succession to the aging Kenyatta. Mboya, 
ever the faithful tool of the leadership, maneuvered 
a KANU conference to redefine the party Vice' Presidency, 
replacing its single incumbant, Odinga, with an eight 
man Vice Presidence representing Kenya’s eight districts. 
The move was specifically designed to eliminate Odinga 
as Kenyatta’s designated successor, an intent made 
all the more clear by the purging of Odinga’s supporters 
during the same conference. Odinga angrily resigned 
from his party and government posts.
You have not given any consideration to me as 
your number two in state affairs. I have a con­
science and this in fact does prick me when I earn 
public money but with no job to do. I consider 
this a waste of public money and I am worried lest 
the future generations question my sincerity when 
they would learn that I allowed myself to hold a 
sinecure post in the midst of poverty and misery 
in our country. With this realization I cannot 
continue to hold this position any longer and 
I hereby tender my resignation.
The final elimination of Odin£a\ was achieved some months 
later after he had formed the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), 
a Luo-based opposition party with socialist leanings.
The party was banned and Odinga imprisoned.
.Joseph Murumbi, a half-Masai, replaced Odinga as
Kenya's Vice President but resigned a few months later,
partly due to political pressures from some of his
dpponents in the government. Daniel Arap Moi, a
Kalenjin, was appointed Kenya's Vice President--a
position he held for twelve years. Even with Moi as
Vice President, Mboya considered himself most likely
66successor to President Kenyatta. He. was national secretary 
of KANU, and unlike party Vice Presidents, who represented 
tribal regions,, Mboya held a national position which 
represented all ethnic regions. However, Mboya's attempt 
to project himself as Kenyatta's successor failed.
Kenyatta, who in 1968 was about 7 5 years old and in poor 
health, had not publicly designated or favored any person, 
as his successor. At the same time Kikuyus, especially 
from Kenyatta's own district of Kiambu,. became increasing­
ly concerned about the possibility of a non-Kikuyu 
successor.
Mboya was seen as a roadblock to another Kikuyu 
President. Two well known journalists in Kenya pick up 
the train of events.
Tom Mboya, the youthful Secretary-General of 
the party,--who, in the independence movement, 
had outwitted some of Macmillan's ablest ministers-, 
and who, because of his legendary efficiency, 
organizational brilliance, cosmopolitan upbringing 
and deeply right-wing world outlook, was the darling 
of establishment forces both at home and in the 
west and was thus regarded by such forces and 
other observers as their favourite successor .to 
Kenyatta. The argument goes that once Mboya--who 
was of course doing all these things to enrich 
his own position--had performed his function 
(namely to help the family to liquidate Odinga 
politically), he (Mboya) had outlived his useful­
ness and must himself be liquidated.^
f
The family refers to the men who were around Kenyatta
s o
and may or may not have been related to him by blood.
On July 5, 1969» Tom Mboya was shot dead in Nairobi. 
The assassin, a Kikuyu, admitted in a public enquiry 
that he had been ordered to kill the "Luo” from the top. 
Key government officials, all of them Kikuyus, were 
suspected as collaborators, but none was ever tried or 
convicted for the crime. ^
Mboya's murder led to a period of political crisis 
between the Luos and the Kikuyus. The Luos started a 
campaign aimed at uniting other tribe's against the
70Kikuyus. Kenyatta, m  the meantime, appealed for
V
calm.
Brothers and sisters, I know that every one 
of us is very much grieved* hut what I appeal 
to you my fellow citizens at this unfortunate 
time--for as you all know death is inevitable and 
it is a path which every one will pass, whether 
he likes it or not, I appeal to you to identify 
ourselves as Kenyans, to unite together as one 
people, and one big tribe of Kenya.
As we know, it is only love and unity that 
can rid us of the disease of separation and dis­
unity, we should not be thinking in terms of I 
come from that place or that district or that
tribe, because all of us are of one tribe and
71that tribe is Kenya.
Despite Kenyatta’s assurances, the Kikuyus reacted
to the Luo threat by restaring oathing which, as in
colonial times, was to enhance the Kikuyu solidarity.
While taking the oath, the Kikuyus swore that the flag
of Kenya should not leave -the House of Mumbi/^ (Mumbi
is the legendary mother of the Kikuyus.)
The oathing ceremonies were condemned all over the
country by other tribes who argued that the Kikuyus
7 3were dividing the country for selfish reasons.' In 
October of 1969, President Kenyatta visited Nyanza
•Province in his continuing effort to obscure Kikuyu 
domination, but the visit proved catastrophic.
On arrival, Kenyatta’s car was stoned, and Kenyatta's 
bodyguard returned fire, killing twenty people and 
woundmg hundreds more/ Kenyatta returned to Nairobi 
without delivering a speech. With the banning of KPU, 
improsonment of Odinga, and the death of Tom Mboya, 
the Luos were left with no political alternatives.
Between 1970-1976, Kenyatta was the dominant force 
of Kenya’s politics. KANU was, to a great extent, 
rubber stamping his policies. Kenyatta dominated 
every political scene, usually by way of arbitrary 
decrees. He supressed political opposition by detaining 
dissidents. During that same period, Josiah Kariuki, 
a prominent Kikuyu politician who attacked governmental, 
economic and political policies, was assassinated. It 
was revealed in a parliamentary hearing that a former 
commissioner of police was seen with Kariuki hours before 
he died.
There were, however, limits to the flagrant abuse 
of constitutional procedures which even some of Kenyatta's 
kinsmen recognized. Beginning in October, 1976, a group 
of Kikuyu politicians, fearing the Kenyatta was already 
too old and physically weak to carry on as head of 
the government, began another campaign aimed at changing 
the Kenya Constitution in order to prevent Moi from
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7 ^ v ■■becoming President. Chapter llo, Section 1 of the
Kenya Constitution reads:
1. If the office of President becomes vacant 
by reason of the death or resignation of 
the President, or by reason of his ceasing 
to hold office by virtue of Section 10
or Section 12 of this Constitution (qv) 
an election of a President shall be held 
within the period of ninety days immedi­
ately following the occurrence of that 
vacancy, and it shall be held in the 
manner prescribed by Section 5 (5) of 
this Constitution (qv).
2. While the office of President is vacant 
as aforesaid, the function of that office 
shall be exercised by the Vice President; 
or if there is no Vice President, or if 
the Vice President considers that he is 
for any reason unable to discharge the 
functions of the office of President, by 
such minister as may be appointed by
the cabinet.
The KANU Constitution called for an annual delegate's
conference every year, the last KANU meeting was held
in 1966 with the main purpose of ousting Odinga from 
7 7KANU. In 1976, a KANU meeting was convened with the
sole purpose of preventing Moi ^ from becoming President 
in the event of the death of Kenyatta. The idea was 
not only to change the Constitution and make it impossible, 
for Moi to succeed Kenyatta, but also to vote Moi out 
of his position as KANU Vice President. (After Odinga1s 
removal from KANU, the party went back to the single
n O
Vice Presidency. Both strategies failed. Oliotiptip, 
a prominent Masai politician, obtained more than the 
two-thirds vote from members of parliament opposing 
both moves. Kenya's Attorney General also warned of 
possible criminal prosecutions of those behind the 
"Change the Constitution Movement." Kenyatta died in 
1978, and Moi became the country's President He appointed 
Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, as Vice President mainly to muster 
the support of the Kikuyus. KANU has not held a meeting 
since 1976, and Moi has repeatedly delayed the election 
of party officials citing his chairmanship of the 
Organization of African Unity as the cause of the delay.
Moi has also barred Odinga and his supporters from 
joining KANU.
The government, in the meantime, has amended the 
Constitution--disallowing the legal existence of an 
organized opposition— thereby legalizing a style of 
government that has effectively prevailed since 1964..
This move reflects government's increasing sensitivity 
to opposition.
CONCLUSION
After the brief experience of inter-tribal soli­
darity which forced the British to relinquish colonial 
rule, the post-independence era in Kenya has been 
characterized by a return to traditional tribally specific 
political cultures. The Kikuyu, who led the struggle 
for national liberation, have succeeded in dominating 
both KANU and the Kenyan government, both by eliminating 
real or potential opposing political organizations, such 
as KADU and the KPU, and individuals, such as Odinga,
Mboya and Kariuki, and by appealing to the common interests 
of all Kenyans to economically develop and socially modern­
ize the country. In juxtaposition to the appeal for 
national unity and modernization, the Kikuyu elite has 
proved to be incapable or unwilling to discard their 
traditional tribal exclusivity and to share political 
power by allowing other tribes to participate fully in 
the political process. They simply cannot conceive of 
the possibility of being governed by an uncircumcized 
Luo.
In order to achieve the ambitious economic goals 
of "African Socialism" and the equity implied by political 
democracy, the Kikuyu elite will have to abandon their.
tribal beliefs and replace them' with the secular and
■U
empirically proven beliefs of modern societies. Thus 
far such a transformation has been impossible. As a 
result, the incompatibility of tribalism and moderniza­
tion delegitimizes the regime among the majority of the 
population and postpones the realization of Kenyatta's 
dream of a single Kenyan "tribe".
Tribalism is a fact of life in contemporary Kenya. 
The practices and attitudes of thousands of years are 
proving resistant to change. Traditional tribal antaga- 
nisms and exclusivenesses, born of the ages and nurtured 
by the British stubbornly impede the achievement of 
national goals. While all the tribes shared behavioral 
patterns on which, it was assumed, "African Socialism" 
could be built, the differences in the application of 
these behaviors has fragmented Kenyan society.
This thesis has traced the origin of and the recent 
history of tribalism in Kenya. Individual tribal 
identities helped stimulate and perpetuate political 
rivalries. However, the government emphasis in "African 
Socialism" rested on the assumption that Kenyan society 
was made up of one whole African tribe, a factor the 
leaders believed would contribute to the effectiveness 
of governmental undertakings of economic quality and 
political democracy. This study has shown that the 
Kenyan people have a strong sense of tradition and revere/.- . 
their historic tribal identities. This produces a deep
and abiding awareness of traditional bonds of social 
solidarity making it impossible to integrate different 
tribes into one social structure.
The government's goal of political democracy has 
not been met because it was based on misconceived 
notions of "African Socialism" which mistakenly 
ignored tribal exclusiveness. In other words,
"African tribalism" existed before "African Socialism" 
and continues to dominate Kenyas society.
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